Email Authentication Cheat Sheet: DMARC, SPF and DKIM Records to Copy and Check
Published 2026-11-14 · Reviewed 2026-11-14 · 7 min read · By the Ingenious AI team
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This cheat sheet collects the three records that decide whether mail claiming to be from your domain is trusted. SPF lists who may send for you. DKIM signs your mail so receivers can verify it was not altered and was authorised by your domain. DMARC tells receivers what to do when the first two do not line up, and where to send the reports. Publish SPF and DKIM first, then DMARC at p=none, read the reports, and enforce to p=reject. Every record below is an example to adapt, followed by the check that proves it works.
SPF: the sending list, in one TXT record
SPF lives as a TXT record on your domain itself. A typical small-business record reads: v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:sendgrid.net ip4:203.0.113.25 -all. Each include authorises a vendor's sending infrastructure; ip4 authorises a literal server; the closing -all says everything else should fail (use ~all, soft fail, only while you are still discovering senders). Your checks: exactly one SPF record exists, the expanded lookup count is under 10, and every vendor you still use is present — and every departed one removed.
SPF's limit is the return-path. It validates the domain in the bounce address, not the From your customer sees, which is why DMARC adds the alignment requirement on top. When you test, send through every authorised platform and confirm spf=pass in the Authentication-Results of a received message — a record that parses is not the same as a record that passes for your real mail streams.
DKIM: the signature, one record per selector
DKIM signs outgoing mail with a private key held by your sender; the public key sits in DNS at selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com. You do not write this record by hand — each sending platform generates it or gives you CNAME delegations to publish. Use 2048-bit keys where offered. Your checks: every platform that sends as you has its own selector published, test messages show dkim=pass with d= set to your domain (not the vendor's), and you keep a register of which selector belongs to which service so rotation never becomes archaeology.
Remember the division of labour: DKIM survives forwarding, because the signature travels with the message; SPF usually breaks on forwarding. That is why aligned DKIM for your major senders is the resilience investment — when a message is forwarded through a mailing list or a customer's auto-forwarder, the signature is what carries its DMARC result through intact.
DMARC: the policy and the reports
DMARC lives at _dmarc.yourdomain.com. A monitoring record: v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]. An enforced record: v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]; adkim=r; aspf=r. The p= value is the instruction — none (report only), quarantine (treat failures as spam), reject (refuse failures). rua is where aggregate reports go; choose a mailbox or report service you will actually read, because those reports are your sender inventory and your spoofing telemetry in one feed.
Your checks: a record exists on the organisational domain, the policy is enforced (not parked at none), subdomains are covered deliberately via sp= if needed, and parked domains carry the lockdown variant — v=DMARC1; p=reject with no rua — alongside a null MX (a single dot as the MX target) announcing they send no mail. Run DomainGuard's free check on your domain and it reads exactly these records back to you in plain English, which is the fastest way to confirm what the internet sees.
The fix order, and the traps that bite everyone
Order matters because each layer depends on the one below. Inventory first, from DMARC reports at p=none. Then SPF hygiene — one record, under the lookup limit, departed vendors removed. Then DKIM alignment — every sender signing as your domain. Then staged enforcement — quarantine percentages rising, then reject. Skipping to reject on day one is the trap that breaks invoicing; staying at none forever is the trap that leaves the door open while feeling finished.
The other recurring traps: multiple SPF records after a tool migration (an instant permerror), DKIM CNAMEs deleted because they looked unused, vendor DKIM signing as the vendor's domain so alignment silently fails, and subdomains forgotten entirely — the marketing subdomain with no DMARC inherits your organisational policy only when it has no record of its own, so check what actually resolves. Every one of these is invisible from your sending side and obvious in reports. Read the reports.
Keep it true: the quarterly five-minute drill
Email authentication is not a project with an end date; it is a posture that drifts as tools change. Quarterly, re-run four checks: a lookup of your DMARC, SPF, and DKIM records as the internet sees them; a scan of the month's aggregate reports for new or failing sources; a lookup count on the expanded SPF record; and one test message per major platform verified in its headers. Five to fifteen minutes, four times a year, and the system that stops your domain being spoofed stays a system rather than a memory.
Print this sheet's summary and pin it where your DNS changes happen: one SPF record, under ten lookups; DKIM signing as your domain on every sender; DMARC enforced at reject with reports going somewhere a human reads them. Those three lines are ninety percent of email-domain defense, and everything else in our guides is commentary on them.
Five actions to take today
- Look up your DMARC record at _dmarc.yourdomain.com and confirm the policy is on the path to p=reject, with rua reports going to a read mailbox.
- Confirm exactly one SPF record exists and its expanded form stays under 10 DNS lookups with no departed vendors.
- Verify every sending platform signs DKIM with d= set to your domain, and log each selector in a register.
- Publish null MX plus p=reject DMARC on every parked domain so it provably sends no mail.
- Re-run the record checks and a per-platform test message quarterly, and skim aggregate reports monthly.
Worked example: Mesa Verde Rentals passes its own cheat sheet
Mesa Verde Rentals, a fictional property company monitoring 4 domains, scored its own setup against this sheet. Findings: DMARC present but parked at p=none for 11 months; two SPF records after a platform migration, causing intermittent permerror; the booking platform signing DKIM as its own domain. Fixes took two afternoons across three weeks: records merged to a single SPF at 7 lookups, branded DKIM enabled, quarantine staged at rising percentages, and p=reject published in week three. Its next monthly report showed 212 spoofed messages sent as its exact domain — all rejected — and legitimate aligned delivery at 99.4 percent.
FAQ
Can I copy these example records directly?
Use them as templates, not literals. Your SPF includes and DKIM keys must name your actual senders and keys; copying a vendor you do not use authorises strangers' infrastructure. Adapt each line, then verify with test messages.
What does -all versus ~all mean in SPF?
-all says unauthorised senders should fail outright; ~all marks them soft fail, a weaker signal used mainly while discovering senders. Mature records should end in -all, with DMARC enforcement doing the real refusing.
Where do DMARC reports actually go?
To the addresses in the rua tag, as daily XML attachments from major receivers. Send them to a report-analysis service or a mailbox someone reviews — unread reports are the most common failure mode in this whole area.
My domain does not send email. Do I still need records?
Yes — the lockdown set. A null MX plus DMARC p=reject tells the world your domain sends nothing, so any mail claiming to be from it is forged by definition. Parked domains without records are free costumes for attackers.
How do I check my records right now?
Run DomainGuard's free domain check, or query DNS directly: TXT at _dmarc.yourdomain.com for DMARC, the TXT record on your domain for SPF, and selector._domainkey for DKIM. Compare what you find against the checks in this sheet.